IRAN Comprehensive Analysis

Iran: Regime Change or Strategic Illusion? Comprehensive Analysis

By Paolo Falconio

Member of the Consejo Rector de Honor and lecturer at the Sociedad de Estudios Internacionales (SEI)

Former Faculty Member at LUISS Business School

“A fascinating and refined analysis that impresses with its historical depth and the clarity with which it exposes the paradoxes of contemporary geopolitics. The article captures a truth too often overlooked: Iran is not merely a regime problem, but a civilization with roots too deep to be reshaped by external models

The article masterfully outlines a scenario where the push for change risks triggering unpredictable transformations, potentially even revitalizing an imperial identity that has long slumbered but never died out. The vision presented—where the fall of the theocracy could lead to a more sophisticated, cohesive, and geopolitically assertive Iran—raises crucial questions: are we truly ready for the Iran to come?

A post-theocratic Iran might not automatically align with the West. Some observers fear that once freed from the Ayatollahs’ ideological grip, Iran might rediscover an imperial and pan-regionalist vocation—perhaps more polished, but no less assertive.

Finally, Israel could face an Iran that is less predictable but more internationally legitimized.

The closing reference to geography as a structural constraint in geopolitics is a flawless and poignant ending.”

The Project for Regime Change in Iran. The Iranian Character.

The Israeli project to trigger a regime change in Iran—shared also by U.S. agencies, particularly the CIA—remains one of Tel Aviv’s main objectives, considering that the Islamic Republic, according to its Constitution, promotes the destruction of the State of Israel. However, for Israeli security, Donald Trump’s approach may prove more effective. He abandoned the Neocon and Democratic rhetoric of exporting democracy and focused pressure on ending Iran’s nuclear program.

In fact, it remains uncertain what kind of government might emerge from the possible collapse of the Ayatollahs’ regime. Iran is not a homogeneous entity; it is a historical reality with an imperial vocation: an ancient civilization, heir to three thousand years of history and culture, composed of diverse ethnic groups (Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs) and traditionally antagonistic toward the West. Any internal change would follow a deeply Persian trajectory, rather than a return to the pro-Westernism of the Shah’s era—a choice that ultimately contributed to its downfall. History doesn’t repeat itself, but it warns us. It is useful to recall that Iran’s endogenous forces once took shape in Mohammed Mossadegh—the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister with a nationalist foundation—who was quickly deposed after nationalizing the oil industry during the 1953 coup d’état orchestrated by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The Shah, once the perpetrator, later became a victim of the Khomeinist revolution. Mossadegh’s famous words perhaps best capture the Iranian character:

“I do not intend to appeal a death sentence nor will I accept any pardon, even if the Shah decides to grant it. Pardon is for traitors—I am instead the victim of foreign intervention.”

The Regional Outlook

Regionally, the scenario is even more complex: even the U.S. does not want a regional power to dominate the Middle East—not even Israel. There are four contenders for regional power—Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

Militarily, Israel and Turkey are undoubtedly the strongest regional powers.

Imperially—meaning how a people perceives itself—Iran and Turkey hold that distinction.

Based on this simplified distinction, we can try to understand the possible consequences and aspirations of the region’s actors.

Turkey and Saudi Arabia will play crucial roles in trying to influence Iran’s future—but in very different, and often competing, ways.

Turkey, under Erdoğan, presents itself as a regional mediator, but with deeply rooted imperial ambitions. Ankara has intensified diplomatic contacts to contain the conflict between Israel and Iran, worried both by regional stability and environmental risks linked to Iranian nuclear facilities near the Turkish border. It also faces domestic pressures tied to its belonging to the Ummah—prompting it to obscure its Azerbaijani oil shipments to Israel. Within its Ottoman-inspired vision, Turkey seeks expanded influence in the Levant and Caucasus, and a weakened Iran may open strategic space for Ankara.

Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, acts more cautiously. After years of rivalry with Tehran, Riyadh has recently attempted reconciliation. Yet the Saudi monarchy remains suspicious: a strong Iran—or one too close to the West—could threaten regional balance and Sunni hegemony. Thus, Saudi Arabia positions itself as a go-between, aiming to maintain a stable Middle East to safeguard its economic and geopolitical interests.

In summary:

Turkey and Saudi Arabia do not want a hegemonic Iran—but neither do they want an uncontrolled collapse. Both seek to influence its fate, though with divergent agendas: Ankara aims for a proactive, assertive role; Riyadh seeks calculated stability. And in this strategic chess match, Iran remains a difficult player to contain.

Lastly, Israel sees the Ayatollah regime as its mortal enemy. However, an overly Westernized Iran may be uncomfortable for Israel as well—possibly diminishing its unique role as the U.S.’s stronghold in the region.

In this necessarily broad overview, we should also consider that, although Iran is currently Washington’s primary concern, the U.S. also watches Ankara’s maritime ambitions—from the Mediterranean to the Ocean—with growing apprehension. For now, the Pentagon tolerates Turkey’s reach for tactical reasons, but clearly considers it a force to contain—and, in this view, Iran may become a more effective counterweight than Saudi Arabia.

The Crux of the Matter and the Possible Involvement of the USA

In this context, the real crux is not so much the toppling of the regime, but the neutralization of Iran’s nuclear potential. The Ayatollah system is now more fragile domestically, yet remains deeply rooted in society. How long it might endure after such a military defeat remains uncertain.

The massive deployment of American military forces could be Trump’s last-ditch attempt to convince Iran, through forceful diplomacy, to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Still, several exogenous factors could lead to U.S. involvement. Among them, the desire for revenge for the 444 days during which U.S. diplomats were held hostage in 1979 during the Khomeinist revolution should not be underestimated. It may sound anachronistic, but it is a thorn that still hurts in parts of the American establishment.

However, direct involvement would inevitably trigger an escalation in tensions with China and Russia, for whom Iran represents a strategic anchor in the Middle East. Russia, which signed a strategic economic partnership agreement, has major plans for a north-south trade corridor terminating in Iran. Yet, it avoided jeopardizing ties with Israel by not supplying Iran with S-400 air defense systems that could have seriously challenged Israeli air superiority.

China’s approach is different. It’s not only a key consumer of Iranian oil (along with Japan), but it has also made significant infrastructure investments within its Belt and Road Initiative. A railway line from China to Iran was recently inaugurated.

Iran’s Posture in the Conflict

Despite its rhetoric, Iran has not yet closed the Strait of Hormuz (which could be done by sinking just a few ships given its narrowness and shallow waters), nor has it struck strategic targets like Israeli nuclear facilities. Tehran knows that refusing compromise or seeking a prolonged conflict would provoke a devastating U.S. response. While no other country can currently match such a projection of power, the battle is existential for Tehran. If left with no alternative, it will fight—a battle already lost, but whose fruits of victory may be fleeting.

What Iran After the Islamic Republic? And the Pakistan Unknown

Every profound transformation unleashes latent cultural forces. When institutional structures collapse, what emerges is not a void but something ancient—perhaps dormant, but never extinguished.

A theocracy might give way to a new form of governance that could paradoxically revive the claim to a singular creative principle (originally found in Zoroastrianism) while simultaneously returning to the roots of the Persian Empire—roots even the harshest theocracy failed to erase. It’s worth noting that the regime’s harshest repression in 2022 came when people organized a pilgrimage (banned by the Ayatollahs) to the tomb of Darius II.

Even the Shiite current was born from the need to reconcile empire and Islam. In essence, Israel might unintentionally pave the way for the rise of a more dangerous adversary—culturally refined, historically rooted, with an unsuppressed imperial identity that may even find sympathy overseas.

History offers parallels, starting with post-Ottoman Turkey: the Kemalist revolution abolished the caliphate and turned a theocratic Islamic empire into a modernizing secular republic. Yet, the tension between secularism and Islamic identity never truly faded—and now reemerges in new forms, just as it might in Iran.

This return to imperial cultural identity after a state’s collapse or transformation is also evident in China and Russia. In short, this is no theoretical scenario.

Another risk in a post-Islamic Republic setting is Iran’s potential shift toward Pakistan—a nation with serious problems but a hardened population and nuclear weapons. Such a drift could further destabilize the Indo-Pacific, already a delicate region, in addition to the Middle East.

Pakistan’s aggressive stance—threatening Israel if it uses its nuclear arsenal against Iran and sending military trucks into Iran after the first Israeli attack wave—warrants serious consideration. This would be a highly unwelcome scenario for the other rising power: India, a critical player in containing China.

All of these factors should push policymakers to reflect carefully on the consequences—ones that extend well beyond the Middle East.

Conclusions

These are people who have been part of the world for 5,000 years, and even if their territory were flattened by American bombs, neither Israel nor the United States has the will to put boots on the ground in Iran. Attempting to fragment it through covert operations would not only be extremely complicated but entire region—and, as we’ve seen, not in the interest of the local powers. After the disasters of previous Middle Eastern interventions in recent years, perhaps it is time to stop and ask whether there is a plan for what comes next.

Regardless of the external influences that would emerge in a political vacuum, we must ask whether the consequences of an Iran no longer treated as an international pariah have been fully considered.

The fall of an obscurantist regime is welcome, but let’s not delude ourselves about what comes after—especially in the long term—because the ashes won’t last forever. We must acknowledge that we are dealing with a people (not just the clergy) with deep imperial cultural roots who do not want to become Western. In the best-case scenario, it may become a democracy, but it will remain the homeland of Shiism and will always contain the seed of empire. On the day when Iran truly elects its own President, what makes us believe that its interests will differ from today’s? In geopolitics, geography dictates the rules.

Paolo Falconio

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