The Transition of Power in Syria and the Loss of Tartus in the Regional and Global Geopolitical Context

The Transition of Power in Syria and the Loss of Tartus in the Regional and Global Geopolitical Context

By Paolo Falconio

Member of the Consejo Rector de Honor and Lecturer at the Sociedad de Estudios Internacionales (SEI) in Madrid

At the time of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, I predicted that a European war would not be comparable to a war in the Middle East. Not because lives are worth less elsewhere, but because Europe—even in this historically irrelevant moment—has the capacity to reflect internal conflicts beyond its borders.

What began as a regional war has transformed into a global strategic challenge, where the hegemonic primacy of the United States has been perceived by Russia as weakened by structural cracks, prompting action where Russia’s existential interests were threatened. The Sarmatian Plain, where Ukraine lies, falls into this category.

In reality, Russia’s return as a global geopolitical actor began much earlier, for example by leveraging atomic diplomacy as a geopolitical tool—offering technology and funding in exchange for political influence, mining concessions, and debt control. All of this was framed within a new Third Worldist narrative inherited from the old USSR. However, the Ukrainian conflict accelerated certain processes, and what were once mere whispers of future projects have become realities—just look at the BRICS.

Naturally, for such a process to have a chance of success, a Sino-Russian bloc has formed, constituting the backbone of an alternative—not to U.S. primacy, but to its hegemonic position inherited from victory over the former Soviet Union.

In the strategy to contain Russia, Syria certainly represents a successful operation. Russia has lost the port of Tartus and thus its logistical hub in the Mediterranean, along with a loyal ally in Assad.

From a geopolitical perspective, the Tartus base played a strategic role in accessing Libya and the Red Sea, as well as serving as a logistical gateway for projection into Sudan and West Africa.

However, a RUSI report notes that the Russian Federation did not and does not aspire to maintain a fleet for high-intensity warfare in the Mediterranean. Rather, it seeks a fleet suited for disruption, support for allies, minor conflict interventions, and intelligence gathering. It has served—and still serves—as a deterrent, but considering its size (11 ships, 3 to 5 of which are auxiliary), Russia does not need a major naval hub to replace Tartus.

Still, Russia wants to maintain its role as a strategic actor in the Mediterranean, which means it needs an operational base with sea access. Recent reports suggest this will be either the port of Tobruk or Benghazi in the Gulf of Sirte.

Tobruk would require investments to support refueling and maintenance operations. Moreover, Russia would be forced to operate in close proximity to civilian merchant traffic. Benghazi would be a more optimal choice, already structured for maintenance and offering more space for new facilities, without the need to operate near merchant fleets. Libya already hosts the Al Kadim airbase managed by the Russians. Located near Benghazi’s port, much of the material from Syria has been transferred there. According to Foreign Policy sources, Russia has rebuilt the runway at Maaten al-Sarra airbase, constructed a new depot, and enhanced its logistical capacity.

Maaten al-Sarra thus appears to be the chosen replacement for the Latakia airbase, offering two additional strategic options: a strong presence near the Sahel and the opportunity to logistically support various private military companies (PMCs) created after the dismantling of the Wagner Group and the newly formed Africa Corps.

All this unfolds in a context where the Russians are the main backers of General Haftar, who could make significant concessions regarding infrastructure usage.

In short, despite some manageable inconveniences, Russia will maintain its presence in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Libya would support its investment project (originally planned for Tartus) of USD 500 million to expand its role as an agricultural exporter to the Middle East and North Africa.

The only real weak point in this setup is Libya’s political instability. Turkish presence is not seen by analysts as an obstacle, since the interests of the two countries in the region do not conflict and they’ve shown they can coexist.

Regarding Haftar’s stance, recent events—such as the parallel government in Benghazi rejecting the European delegation composed of Italian Minister Piantedosi, the interior ministers of Greece and Malta, and the EU Commissioner for Migration, Magnus Brunner—suggest a choice not of total closure toward Europe, but an awareness that military and financial support comes from Russia and Turkey. If Benghazi becomes the new Tartus, it’s plausible that the current Russian contingent of 2,000 men will increase.

Even the complications related to fleet maintenance and refueling operations, pending the setup or creation of a naval base, could be bypassed by leveraging Algerian facilities. Algeria, a traditional Russian ally, receives 85% of its military equipment and training from Russia, and access to existing maintenance structures could be a relatively harmless compromise for Algiers—less so than hosting a permanent Russian base.

In short, everything seems to confirm Libya’s role as a stronghold for continuing to pursue Russian interests on the continent, particularly in Central Africa, Mali, Niger, and Sudan.

This scenario, which is currently the most plausible, could nevertheless change.

The recent rapprochement between Washington and Haftar, who seeks international recognition, could lead to a shift in posture less favorable to the Russians. Certainly, Haftar is not Assad in terms of loyalty. If that were to happen, Algeria would become the last resort for remaining in the Mediterranean. However, Algiers would still have to take into account its economic relations with the EU, from which 93% of its incoming economic flows originate.

The alternative would be Sudan, but forcing the Russian fleet to pass through Suez would certainly mean seriously compromising its operational capabilities.

From a global geopolitical perspective, we must make an effort to understand: What are Russia’s priorities? Consequently, we must shift from a regionally limited approach to a systemic view of the world order.

Are we sure Syria was that important? The Middle East is full of actors and local conflicts before regional ones. Strategic progress is hard to achieve there. In Africa, on the other hand, Putin—as mentioned in the introduction—has organized a massive geopolitical offensive centered on the revival of communist Third Worldism, nuclear diplomacy, arms sales (also to create markets for the war economy), and the former Wagner Group, now replaced by the Africa Corps. Libya and the Sahel fit into this global approach, just like the Arctic.

For the purposes of this analysis, Syria—and now Libya—fit into the mechanism that sees the war in Ukraine as a transitional moment toward a medium-term realignment of geopolitical balances.

While America continues to view Russia as a secondary actor in a containment strategy, Russia—alongside China—is playing a global game that could be extremely risky for the U.S. if it fails to grasp the scale of the challenge. A challenge that is dangerous because it’s ideological and based on delegitimizing the West and American politics in particular. A challenge not only on the military front, but also in terms of international consensus.

In this sense, some choices made, in my opinion, signal a systematic underestimation of the actors involved.

The figure of a former jihadist like Al Jolani as Assad’s successor effectively prevents the formation of a Syrian state not plagued by continuous ethnic and religious clashes—aside from the Bedouins (a new name for former jihadists), who seek foreign aid, opening potential doors to external influence. Even Israel, America’s top ally, cannot and will not allow the consolidation of a Syria dominated by a jihadist movement that, in recent events, has shown it cannot evolve into anything else—despite diplomatic make-up efforts. Consider the attacks on Christians, Alawites, and most recently the Druze, which triggered Israel’s reaction, long aligned with this ethno-religious group (though I believe the real reason is the one previously stated). Al Jolani, now Ahmed al-Sharaa, cannot fully dissociate himself from the power group that comes from that world and supports him on the ground.

Unless the U.S. provokes a change in the balance of power in Libya and puts pressure on Algeria sufficient to force the Russians to pass through the Suez Strait via Sudan—which would truly compromise the Russian strategic setup—the fall of Assad has complicated matters for the Russians, but doesn't have a significant long-term strategic impact, as the penetration into Africa has already occurred and they seem to have an alternative in place.

It is equally true that the Russians will face greater difficulties if their surface fleet remains as it is, since its operational autonomy was based on short supply lines. That said, the unfortunate choice of Assad’s successor currently does not appear capable of guaranteeing the stability of the region, as territorial control partially escapes the newborn central government. This is a factual reality that will undermine the credibility of the announced adherence to the Abraham Accords.

The Israeli bombing, in the end, is a stark reminder of the situation on the ground. A volatile mix in a country whose infrastructure is collapsing and is lacking everything: electricity, water, bread, and medical care.

Finally, this situation poses a security risk for Europe. It must ensure that among exiles and displaced persons, no terrorist cells infiltrate—cells that cannot be equated with Taliban shepherds. Syrians are culturally refined, making them hard to identify. This increases their danger and, consequently, the risks.

The global match also passes through the Mediterranean and Africa, which by 2050 will reach a population of two and a half billion people. Numbers mean power, and Europe—whether it be Rome, Madrid or Berlin—will have to reckon with it.

In this match, the West can play a key role, provided it abandons outdated approaches and double standards. The era of top-down policies is over, because today nations have alternatives—even if they are not particularly democratic—that still intervene or present themselves as drivers of development.

We must return to mechanisms for selecting leadership based on merit. The hybrid peace we currently experience will also affect the domestic front, and here too, globalist logic and the growing imbalance in wealth distribution are no longer sustainable.

In conclusion, after this extensive analysis, I believe—even if it’s something the U.S. doesn’t want to hear, as it represents yet another existential challenge—that the match is fundamentally the same as the Cold War.

We must convince both domestic and international public opinion of the validity of our development model, because a direct clash between nuclear superpowers is inconceivable.

NATO should be strengthened in the spirit of the defensive alliance it was founded upon, along with the security guarantee of the American nuclear umbrella; otherwise, nothing will prevent nuclear proliferation.

We need strong, redistributive economies, industrial policies, innovation, but also credible armies and skilled diplomacy.

Simply put, what’s urgently needed is a true strategy—one that recognizes the world has already changed and that the challenge we face is cultural even before it is political. Geopolitics will have to take this into account, as it will shape the very narrative of the Western model.

Paolo Falconio

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