Italy and Russian Espionage

Italy and Russian Espionage

By Paolo Falconio 

Italy, due to its strategic position and its role in NATO and the EU, has long been a prime target for Russian espionage activities—an endeavor that is anything but benevolent, as one might expect. Over the past ten years, at least eight significant cases of Russian intelligence operations on Italian soil have been documented, often linked to NATO interests.

These intelligence activities are not merely Cold War relics but a current and sophisticated reality that exploits the digital and social vulnerabilities of modern democracies. Italy is no exception.

In the 1960s and 1970s, according to the Mitrokhin dossier, around 140 KGB agents operated in Italy, often under diplomatic or journalistic cover, with support from the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Their goal was to obtain industrial secrets from companies like Fiat, Olivetti, and Eni.

Today, Russian agencies (SVR, GRU, FSB) conduct human intelligence (Humint) operations, attempting to infiltrate strategic sectors and influence democratic processes. Some analysts have even speculated about interference in elections and efforts to approach Italian political figures. Beyond speculation, there are documented cases involving Italian territory being used as an operational base or a site for information exchange. This suggests a coordinated and persistent campaign rather than isolated incidents.

According to some investigations, the GRU and SVR are the main actors in Italy, though certain sectors of the FSB (successor to the KGB) are also active. These agencies are partly involved in Sigint operations (interception of communications and cyber-espionage), but the majority of their efforts focus on Humint—human intelligence. In simple terms, this means recruiting and managing covert collaborators embedded in sensitive institutional structures and strategic sectors of the Italian system.

The war in Ukraine, regardless of how one interprets it, represents a deep fracture into which these and other threats have inserted themselves. What must be understood is that we are dealing with individuals trained during a time when the USSR, alongside the USA, dominated the world. A legacy of skills, techniques, dossiers, and contacts persists—not lost, but rather enabling the Russians to effectively develop new tools of penetration tailored to our open societies, often manifesting as hybrid warfare operations.

While I find it idiotic and boorish to prevent a Russian conductor from performing or to boo a Russian soprano at La Scala, we should instead ask ourselves why we are such an attractive target for Russian intelligence activities. This is a societal issue. It’s not about fueling cheap Russophobia, but about reading the reality we live in and becoming aware of the threat—a level of awareness that, in my view, is lacking in civil society.