The Atomic Crescent: Pakistan’s New Nuclear Projection

The Atomic Crescent: Pakistan’s New Nuclear Projection

By Paolo Falconio

Member of the Honorary Governing Council and Lecturer at the Society of International Studies (SEI)

Abstract

Historically anchored in a bilateral nuclear deterrence doctrine vis-à-vis India, Pakistan is now redefining its strategic posture with an extra-regional scope. The recent signing of the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia marks a pivotal shift: Islamabad is positioning itself as a nuclear guarantor for the Gulf monarchies and, potentially, for the entire Umma. In this context, nuclear deterrence is no longer a defensive tool but a lever of geopolitical projection.

Pakistan’s transition from a regional containment logic to a strategic guardianship of the Islamic world is exemplified by the SMDA with Saudi Arabia, which introduces a mutual defense clause akin to a bilateral “Article 5.” This posture had already surfaced during the “12-day war” between Iran and Israel, when Pakistan issued a warning of nuclear retaliation should Israel resort to atomic weapons.

Many commentators tend to downplay the event, but in my view, it is a signal that warrants careful consideration, even if the operational details of the agreement remain to be assessed.

First and foremost, Pakistan steps out of a strictly regional dimension, where its nuclear arsenal served primarily as a deterrent against India, itself a nuclear power. With this agreement, Pakistan projects itself into the Gulf and could become a reference point for other wealthy monarchies in the region—especially in light of Israeli policies that transcend the status of U.S. allies, as seen in the episode of the attack on Qatar. This wealth could hypothetically act as a catalyst for an already rapidly expanding nuclear program. In essence, Pakistan ties its nuclear strength to the security of a Gulf monarchy that, beyond being a major economic and financial partner in the region, holds significant weight in the Sunni Islamic world. This means Islamabad is accrediting itself as a defender and guarantor of the Umma’s security, assuming a role that transcends national borders.

This shift opens the door to two dynamics: on one hand, the embryonic formation of an “atomic crescent” stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the Middle East; on the other, a polarization with Israel, which perceives a threat from an Islamic nuclear actor capable of projecting power far beyond its original sphere.

In short, Pakistan is entering extra-regional dynamics and rising as the sole nuclear power in the Islamic world capable of exercising real deterrence in its defense. This posture may not be limited to the Gulf countries. A glance at the atlas reveals a semicircle of Muslim-majority nations surrounding Pakistan, into which it could project such deterrence in the future. Naturally, the embryonic “atomic crescent” is a complex operation subject to many limitations and vulnerabilities: internal divisions within the Islamic world, dependence on China, Russian influence in Central Asian republics, and the American military presence in the region. Such projection will require, first and foremost, strong political will, and secondly, the ability to synthesize strategic pragmatism with identity-driven ambition.

This embryonic “atomic crescent,” though currently a geopolitical speculation, reflects not only an internodal world where middle powers seek space, but also a global identity trend in which religious affiliation is gaining increasing relevance. The phenomenon is not exclusive to the Sunni or broader Islamic world—it manifests elsewhere with varying intensity: in India, where Modi’s policies aim to impose a Hindu-based national vision; in Russia, where the Moscow Patriarchate identifies with the state structure and Mother Russia; in Israel, where a biblical-identity dimension of the state is increasingly affirmed. To a lesser extent, the phenomenon is also present in the United States.

As of March 2022, Pakistan possesses an estimated nuclear arsenal of approximately 170 warheads. According to the Arms Control Association (ACA), it is the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal globally, a fact that has triggered U.S. sanctions. Moreover, Pakistan is believed to actively export weapons and nuclear technologies. Specifically, the ACA reports that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal includes:

- Short-range ballistic missiles (up to 1,000 km): Hatf-1, Abdali (Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4), Shaheen-1A (Hatf-4), Nasr (Hatf-9)

- Medium-range ballistic missiles (1,000–3,000 km): Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6), Shaheen-3 (Hatf-10), Ghauri-1 (Hatf-5), Ghauri-2 (Hatf-5A), Ababeel

- Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) reportedly under development, notably the Taimur with a range of 7,000 km

- Cruise missiles: Babur (Hatf-7), Babur-2, Babur-3, Ra’ad (Hatf-8), Ra’ad-2

- Strategic bombers: modified American F-16/B and French Mirage 2000 aircraft (ACA source, though data is contested)

- Some systems are designed to carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

- According to some sources (IRIAD – Archivio Disarmo), Pakistan may possess three submarines capable of carrying nuclear weapons, though the number of warheads per unit is unknown, and their second-strike capability remains uncertain.

The Islamabad–Jerusalem distance (3,600 km) already falls within the operational range of several existing delivery systems.

Pakistan’s traditional political instability, coupled with the presence of extremist groups, adds further concern regarding its nuclear assets.

Its nuclear doctrine is one of ambiguity and escalation:

- It includes the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons in response to conventional or political threats.

- It is based on a flexible deterrence strategy, covering strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Adding to this is the proximity of China and Iran, both possessing advanced missile technologies, which makes the overall picture far from reassuring. Iran itself may revise its strategy in light of Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella—either aligning with it or pivoting toward its own nuclear weapon in pursuit of imperial ambitions and leadership of the Shiite world.

Returning to the comparison with Israel, while the use of nuclear weapons against the Jewish State remains a residual hypothesis due to distance and the consequences it would entail—especially vis-à-vis the U.S., and considering Israel’s second-strike capabilities—it is worth recalling that Israel is defined by American analysts as a “one bomb state,” meaning a single nuclear impact would be devastating due to its small size.

In a region struggling to achieve stability, Pakistan’s new posture is far from negligible. From Israel’s perspective, the issue is not merely the distance or technical capacity of Pakistani missiles: the real geopolitical crux is the transformation of deterrence, which is no longer confined to bilateral conflict but assumes an ideological and identity-based character (the defense of the Umma). Israel thus risks becoming the symbolic target of a nuclear power that legitimizes itself precisely through opposition to it.

Moreover, the risk of a nuclear entanglement extending beyond the Middle Eastern theater is real.

In summary, Pakistan’s new posture marks a watershed moment: nuclear capability is no longer viewed as a balancing tool with India, but as a lever of global Islamic power. This is the true geopolitical fracture—the entry of Pakistan into a dimension that transforms it from a regional power into a potentially pivotal actor in the security of the Islamic world.

Paolo Falconio

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