Systemic Fragility in the European Union and Germany’s Strategic Centrality

Systemic Fragility in the European Union and Germany’s Strategic Centrality

Di Paolo Falconio 

Miembro del Consejo Rector de Honor y profesor en la Sociedad de Estudios Internacionales (SEI)

Amid the growing structural fragility of the European Union, Germany continues to serve as the keystone of the European edifice. This role is accentuated by France’s internal political turbulence and persistent economic slowdown, as well as the United Kingdom’s decision to pursue Brexit as a means of managing its own domestic fractures—despite facing similar economic challenges. In this scenario, Berlin remains the only continental actor capable of combining industrial capacity with fiscal discipline.

This dual foundation—productive strength and financial solidity—constitutes a necessary prerequisite for any credible European ambition of partial strategic autonomy in the field of defense.

Despite Brexit, London has reaffirmed its role as the primary conduit for U.S. geopolitical projection onto the continent, consolidating a northern axis that includes Poland, Scandinavia, and the Baltic States. This strategic reconfiguration has shifted Europe’s center of gravity eastward and northward, seemingly dethroning Germany’s leadership role within the EU—namely, its ability to shape the continental agenda. For now, these are symptoms, but the trend appears to support the hypothesis.

The recent Copenhagen summit offers a telling illustration: Berlin’s attempt to initiate a discussion on loosening fiscal constraints was overshadowed by an agenda entirely focused on deterrence toward Moscow. Germany’s inability to introduce even a marginal proposal highlights the increasing external direction of Europe’s strategic priorities.

This dynamic appears paradoxical when one considers that Germany’s triple-A rating implicitly guarantees the sovereign debt of a significant portion of its European partners, and that over two-thirds of the continental economy is directly integrated into its value chain.

At the same time, Germany remains the only EU member state with an advanced industrial-technological base and substantial fiscal capacity. Behind a cautious posture, the Federal Republic is actively developing a multidomain defensive architecture—including the space dimension—through industrial partnerships with U.S. firms, while ensuring that critical infrastructure remains located on German soil. This configuration implies a transfer of know-how and the construction of operational autonomy that could, over time, reduce dependence on Atlantic protection.

It is therefore unsurprising that the most pronounced concerns regarding this trajectory come not from Moscow, but from Paris—traditionally a leader in the space sector and a prominent military actor.

Domestically, the rise of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) reflects a growing disenchantment with the European project and could serve as a catalyst for recalibrating Germany’s posture toward the Union itself.

In light of these considerations, any strategic attempt to marginalize Berlin appears short-sighted. Germany remains the principal guarantor of the Union’s economic stability and systemic coherence. Ignoring this reality would constitute a long-term political risk of considerable magnitude.