The Diplomacy of the Pause

The Diplomacy of the Pause  

The Xi Jinping–Trump Summit

By Prof. Paolo Falconio

Member of the Honorary Governing Council and lecturer at the Society of International Studies (SEI)

I really liked this definition given by Gilles Touboul in his analysis of the summit. Now, I won’t interpret his analysis—which I encourage you to read—but I’m borrowing this definition because I believe it perfectly encapsulates the U.S. posture during the Sino-American summit.

From form to substance, a fragility in the American position emerges. It’s a stance of political realism, which, in my view, stems from two considerations. The first is domestic, aimed at not further jeopardizing the U.S. economy—something a trade war with China would have triggered, especially in terms of market reaction, but also due to current American industrial vulnerabilities that prevent the U.S. from contemplating a direct confrontation with the Dragon: from logistics, such as shipbuilding, to refined raw materials. These are sectors that will take time to rebalance the status quo.

From an international perspective, the war in Ukraine and a very fragile pseudo-peace in Israel make a full American disengagement from these areas impossible. If we add the potential new Venezuelan adventure (deemed “madness” by the military leadership that was supposed to command it and instead chose retirement in protest), it becomes clear that a temporary arrangement was the only viable path.

From a formal standpoint—and for the Chinese, form is substance—we saw a verbose Trump who acknowledged China’s status as a superpower, or at least treated it as such, and who, unlike all previous administrations, never mentioned Taiwan. In contrast, Xi remained silent and sparing with compliments.

The result is a China strengthened in its confidence, despite its ongoing internal issues, to the point that the domestic debate in China was dominated by the new Five-Year Plan.

However, the above should not be interpreted as a long-term peace. The increasing militarization of the South China Sea, the announced nuclear submarine components of the two Koreas, all point to a postponed challenge and an America that has not abandoned containment. The corollary is China’s need to maintain good relations with Russia, which, in addition to supplying the energy needed for technological competition, ensures stability in the northern seas and access to Arctic routes.

In short, those who see this summit as a normalization of Sino-American relations fail to grasp its systemic implications, such as technological governance, which remain unresolved.

In the background looms Taiwan—a topic discussed in the U.S.—but if left to its fate, it would pose a concrete risk of a significant loss of influence in the Indo-Pacific alliance system. In essence, this was a summit of a transitory and tactical nature. It was not a true détente, but a strategic suspension, useful to

 both contenders.