The Turkish Variable

The Turkish Variable

By Paolo Falconio  

Honorary Member of the Governing Council and Professor at the Society for International Studies (SEI)

While the world recounts the atrocities of the Ayatollahs’ regime and a U.S. Navy carrier strike group approaches the Gulf area — together with other assets such as tankers that normally move only in anticipation of kinetic operational scenarios — the Islamic Republic appears to have regained control of the streets.  

Western media weeps for the poor Iranians who will not be able to live like us, immersed in TV series, revealing a profound ignorance of Iranian society and its imperial, nationalist character. In exchange, we may witness a potential American military action.

With or without military action, the Islamic Republic emerges defeated from its confrontation with the Israeli‑American axis. Its proxies have shown that Iranian support does not equate to an alliance.

Is Israel celebrating? Partly yes, but strategically it has created space for a new actor. Because with Iran’s retreat, highways have opened for Turkey. A Turkey increasingly threatening to the Jewish State — to the point that some, in those latitudes, describe it as the most dangerous of enemies. And it is a “far more dangerous antagonist” than Tehran not because of ideological fanaticism, but due to its combination of international role, autonomous military‑industrial apparatus, and strategic depth.

In Syria, Turkey is the dominus, and beyond projecting itself to the shores of the Adriatic and Libya, it is also present in the Gulf, in Somalia, where it is building an air base that will be used to test ballistic missiles. A projection that goes well beyond the classical Middle East. In short, from Syria to Libya, from the Balkans to East Africa, Ankara is constructing a network of presence that, taken as a whole, ends up encircling Israel and limiting its freedom of action. This geography of power is made even more unsettling by the fact that Turkey is not an external actor to the Western system, but a NATO member capable of acting from within the Euro‑Atlantic perimeter.

Hence the Israeli reaction toward the Syrian regime in support of the Kurds, and the recognition of Somaliland — a part of Somali territory seeking independence from Mogadishu. Within this competition emerges the real novelty, and one quite worrying for Tel Aviv: Washington confirms that Syria falls under Turkish responsibility and does not recognize Somaliland. Not only that: despite Netanyahu’s protests, the Turks will be the pivot around which the management of the Gaza Strip will revolve, with Trump’s blessing.

In essence, it seems that, in practice, Israeli interests no longer automatically prevail in Washington — at least not over Turkish ones. The idea is that Israel is discovering the limits of its influence in the United States, especially when confronted with a NATO ally endowed with regional critical mass and open channels with Russia, to the point that in some areas they coexist because they have complementary interests.

If you thought that the loss of Russian bases in Syria was a strategic defeat, well, those bases remain under Russian control, and in Libya coexistence is peaceful, as it is in the Horn of Africa.

Ankara proves to be not only a regional actor but a pivot between different power systems, capable of remaining within the Western perimeter while cooperating with Moscow whenever interests converge.

This makes Turkey far more insidious than Iran: less easily demonized, more integrated, more flexible. An actor that holds a central position in key dossiers, forcing Washington into postures that place it at odds with the Israeli government.

With hindsight, for Israel it would have been far better to face an Iran that was, all things considered, manageable, isolated, and above all non‑lethal, rather than a Turkey that is slowly encircling it and eroding the unconditional U.S. support it had always enjoyed.

In short, recent years seem to highlight a series of tactical victories against Tehran, but in parallel the unconscious construction of a less favorable strategic context.

We live in a time when the certainties of the past are collapsing under the pressure of great‑power competition. The situation may evolve — not least because Israel is irreplaceable in the Middle Eastern context — yet for now it appears destined to coexist with an empire on the rise..