Attack on Iran: First Reflections

Attack on Iran: First Reflections

By Paolo Falconio

In recent years I have sought, with the tools at my disposal, to contribute to the understanding of geopolitics. I do not possess all the keys, but I know that some Italian academic courses make use of my material, and this encourages me to continue. This premise, perhaps inelegant, is necessary to justify a reflection on Iran that is dissonant with the enthusiastic tones I saw yesterday on our television networks.

If one places oneself on the level of superstructure, the death of Khamenei may appear as a relief: a symbolic figure of an obscurantist regime disappears. But geopolitics does not feed on emotions; it feeds on power relations. It is structure, and it concerns survival. From Hans Morgenthau to Kenneth Waltz, what matters is not the moral legitimacy of actors but their capacity to survive within the anarchic international system. For this reason, popular jubilation—though understandable—finds no confirmation in strategic logic.

From this perspective, for the United States and Israel, the only true victory would be regime change or the fragmentation of the Islamic Republic. This is not a personal opinion; these are declared objectives. Obviously, I am not in a position to make predictions, but according to prevailing models, the rally ’round the flag effect—that is, a population closing ranks around its flag in the face of an external threat—makes the outbreak of a revolt unlikely at this moment.

This leads to several considerations that will have consequences. First, this is not a preventive war, but a discretionary choice precisely because of the stated objective, and this will weigh heavily next Tuesday when the United States Congress convenes and, with Republicans at the forefront, tightens what is considered the third “questionable” use of the President’s power to wage war. The tension between executive decision and legislative oversight in wartime is not merely a domestic dynamic, but a factor that affects the long-term sustainability of the conflict.

A regime that, in any case, deserves to fall without regret. It is owed to all Iranians who are weary of obscurantist clerical governments. If only it were possible to have an Iran that does not reflect itself solely as a destabilizing actor in the Middle East through domination over Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq, extending even to the destruction of Israel.

A chorus of American analysts tells us that the President’s decision was taken without reflection—using a military metaphor, “without a General Staff.” Others speak of a strategy in which players stand ready to lead an uprising within the ranks of the Pasdaran and the army. Between these two interpretations, I personally listen to the Israelis, who say that the heaviest operational burden rests on their shoulders and that they would aim at an insurrection of minorities.

A regime change more favorable to the West is possible, but it is only one of several possible outcomes. The sincere hope is that there is no improvisation without any real plan for the aftermath.

The decisive question therefore remains open: is this choice part of a long-term strategy, or is it the trigger of a dynamic that could spiral out of control? In an already fragmented international system, the Rubicon has been crossed—a fact that is not merely a military act, but a shift in the phase of the regional order. We are at war, a war in which internal Iranian sources report that, despite the decapitation, Iran has reconstituted a government and, judging by the military reaction observed, this would appear to be a plausible hypothesis.

A military reaction sparing no one, precisely because the leadership has been struck—forcing it to respond with everything it possesses, targeting Israel and the Gulf countries hosting American bases, and rendering the Strait of Hormuz impracticable. All in order to restore a deterrence that prevents future decapitations. In highly personalized regimes, the vulnerability of the leadership equals the vulnerability of the state.

This points toward a broad regional conflict, perhaps destined to endure over time. Of course, a rapid de-escalation is also possible, but with an Iran that will make no concessions on civilian nuclear matters. The coming weeks will reveal the true extent of Iranian capabilities and the resilience, in terms of internal cohesion, of Iran’s domestic components: if Tehran were to saturate opposing defenses and inflict significant blows without collapsing internally, it could even proclaim victory, in a confrontation reminiscent of the parable of Samson and Goliath.

Naturally, a devastated Iran would be an extremely high price to pay, but it remains uncertain to what extent the United States is prepared to sustain a prolonged conflict, especially in light of reports suggesting a limited capacity to maintain intensive bombing over time. In the background move China and Russia, which may favor pacification but will hardly abandon Tehran entirely.

Moreover, it would be unwise not to consider Iran’s leadership role in the Muslim world, and the news of crowds protesting outside the American consulate in Karachi, Pakistan—where Americans reportedly were forced to open fire—is not a positive sign.

The outcome is unpredictable, but what will ultimately matter is the strategic result: if for Washington and Tel Aviv victory coincides with regime change (and I hope it is achieved), for Iran it may be sufficient simply to continue to exist, and in that case it would have a powerful narrative to offer the Muslim world.