Ukraine Strikes Moscow. The Erosion of Deterrence

Ukraine Strikes Moscow. The Erosion of Deterrence

By Paolo Falconio

Yesterday, more than 500 Ukrainian drones struck deep inside Russian territory, reaching as far as the capital and destroying—or at least damaging—apartment buildings, chip factories, and component‑manufacturing facilities. Ukrainian attacks appear more effective than ever: medium‑range drones target Russian air‑defense systems, creating corridors that allow long‑range drones to hit targets in depth. Tactically, there is nothing new here, except for the fact that Ukraine has quadrupled its production of medium‑range drones. According to Ukrainian sources, these operations—particularly those against refineries—have caused a 10% loss in Russia’s refining capacity.

Now, while it is true that Russian refining capacity has decreased, it must be noted that, according to Western international agencies, the Hormuz crisis and the loosening of U.S. sanctions could allow Russia to recoup four years of war expenditures within three months. Even halving these projections would mean that the financial pressure that seemed to be weighing on the Russian economy in recent months has been neutralized by a market increasingly hungry for raw materials—materials that the war in Iran has made difficult to access and, in any case, extremely costly.

This development constitutes an escalation in the Russian‑Ukrainian conflict, to the point that Moscow has announced three days of nuclear exercises involving 64,000 personnel, 7,200 vehicles, two hundred launchers, the Northern and Pacific Fleets, and 13 units including nuclear ballistic‑missile submarines (SLBMs) and hunter‑killers. Both ballistic and cruise missiles will be launched. Although the exercise had been announced while Putin was in China, it is self‑evident that this is a message directed at Kyiv and, above all, at Europe—especially since nuclear assets stationed in Belarus will also be involved.

The point is not the exercise itself, but its scale, and the message being conveyed: Russia may have reached the limit of a fading deterrent and may be considering more concrete actions to restore the perception of its willingness to use its nuclear arsenal—perhaps through a demonstrative salvo (as suggested by Putin’s adviser Karaganov). Such a choice could, depending on the targets struck, result in consequences ranging from hundreds of thousands to hundreds of millions of victims, due to nuclear fallout, firestorms, resource contamination, and radiogenic effects.

It is possible—perhaps even likely—that this is yet another warning without real consequences. However, it must be noted that the hawkish faction in Moscow appears increasingly influential, and for Putin, losing the war or accepting a peace deemed unsatisfactory would amount to the end of his political career—and perhaps not only his political career. Of course, any peace must also be acceptable to Ukraine, considering the situation on the ground.

Meanwhile, from António Costa to Zelensky, and even Putin himself, statements are emerging that seem to open the door to the possibility of a negotiating table.

Perhaps we should seriously consider every opportunity for peace, especially because the impression is that the Russian leadership feels it is at a crossroads—aware that it has eroded the credibility of its nuclear deterrent and, consequently, of the need to restore it, particularly in light of its conventional limitations. For all the problems of the Russian Bear, we are nonetheless in a phase of confrontation with what remains, at present, the world’s largest nuclear power. According to the well‑known American analyst Mearsheimer, we are on the path of escalation and without communication channels. And this is perhaps the most worrying element of all.