Hormuz, the Breaking Point of the War Between the United States and Iran

Hormuz, the Breaking Point of the War Between the United States and Iran

By Paolo Falconio

The war between the United States and Iran is entering a phase in which the issue is no longer simply determining who can strike harder, but understanding how far the escalation can go before it turns into an uncontrollable regional crisis.

The latest reports mark a further escalation. The explosions on Kharg Island, one of Iran’s main oil terminals, reported by international media, carry implications that go far beyond the immediate military objective. Striking the Kharg area means targeting one of the key nodes through which Iran channels an essential share of its energy exports onto international markets. The war is therefore moving directly into the architecture of the global energy system.

But the true center of gravity of the conflict remains the Strait of Hormuz.

Here, the military and economic dimensions coincide. Hormuz is not simply a maritime passage: it is one of the principal arteries through which oil and gas from the Gulf reach global markets. Any threat to its security immediately affects energy prices and, through them, inflation, economic growth, and international financial stability.

This is precisely why the reported Iranian proposal to Oman for joint management of the Strait carries particular geopolitical significance. If confirmed, Muscat’s rejection would signal Iran’s difficulty in transforming its geographical position into regional political consent. Tehran may possess significant capabilities to interdict maritime traffic, but that does not automatically translate into the diplomatic capacity to govern it.

And here one of the fundamental contradictions of Iran’s strategy emerges.

Iran can threaten Hormuz, but a prolonged blockade of the Strait could turn a strategic lever into a weapon against itself. The Iranian economy also depends on the ability to trade, export energy, and maintain its channels of interaction with the outside world.

Washington, for its part, appears to be moving along an equally risky path. Donald Trump’s warning about the possibility of striking nuclear centrifuges and the Pickaxe Mountain area suggests that the American objective could progressively shift from simply degrading Iran’s military capabilities to destroying the strategic infrastructure considered essential to its nuclear program.

The problem is that every new target changes the nature of the war.

If Iran interprets attacks on its strategic infrastructure as an existential threat, its response is unlikely to remain confined to Iranian territory. Strikes against U.S. targets in Jordan already demonstrate how the conflict is taking on a regional dimension.

This is the classic mechanism of escalation: each actor seeks to restore deterrence by responding to the previous attack, but in doing so creates the conditions for the next one.

And this is precisely the most dangerous point.

The United States possesses overwhelming military superiority, particularly in air power, naval capabilities, and intelligence. But military superiority does not necessarily translate into the ability to achieve a political outcome.

Destroying infrastructure is relatively easy. Determining what kind of order should emerge after that destruction is infinitely more difficult.

This is why the American military presence in the region must also be assessed carefully. The overall number of personnel present in the Middle Eastern theater does not correspond to the ground force immediately available for a large-scale combat operation. The forces actually deployable as a ground combat force are in the order of 10,000 personnel: sufficient for special operations, infrastructure security, raids, and rapid actions, but entirely different from the mass required to sustain a prolonged ground war or an occupation of Iran.

The distinction is strategically decisive.

Washington can project enormous power through air power, missiles, naval forces, intelligence, and technological capabilities. It can strike deeply into Iran’s military and infrastructure apparatus. But turning this superiority into territorial control is another matter entirely.

Iran is a country of continental scale, with a large population, considerable strategic depth, an extremely complex geography, and significant missile and asymmetric capabilities. A major ground operation would therefore require a completely different scale of forces from those currently available.

The problem of the “day after” thus becomes even more difficult.

What will the ultimate objective of the United States be? To change Iran’s behavior? Destroy its nuclear program? Reduce its military capabilities? Weaken the regime? Or reshape the balance of power in the Middle East?

These are profoundly different objectives, each involving different costs and risks.

The war is therefore approaching its real dilemma. The United States can probably increase military pressure on Iran even further. But every increase in pressure simultaneously reduces the space available for a diplomatic solution and increases Iran’s incentives to employ its asymmetric capabilities.

Hormuz represents precisely this paradox.

It is a lever through which Tehran can threaten the global economy, but it is also the point at which a regional crisis can become a systemic crisis.

For this reason, the decisive question is no longer simply who will win the next battle.

The question is whether Washington and Tehran will still be capable of stopping before military logic makes political action impossible.

Because in modern wars, the most dangerous moment is not necessarily when armies are fighting.

It is when neither side can afford to lose anymore, but neither has yet found a way to win.